ABSTRACT In recent years, role-based access control (RBAC) has become the de facto access control model due to its good applicability and high flexibility. Since the organizations need to update the access control policies to meet the changes in employees, departments, business processes, and so on. The RBAC system has to define new roles and becomes more and more bloated because it's difficult to modify the role-permission assignment with no or minimal impact to other users and roles. Hence, there is a great need to reconfigure the RBAC system over time to reduce its structural complexity and keep as close as possible to the original. Several RBAC reconfiguration approaches have been proposed aiming at generating roles similar to the deployed ones, but they neglect the differences in deployed roles that some of them are useless for the system and generate more roles than needed, which in turn increases the system structure complexity. In this paper, we first propose three indicators to evaluate the quality of deployed roles and define the problem of hierarchy RBAC reconfiguration with minimal weight structure complexity and perturbation. Then, the hierarchy RBAC reconfiguration approach and its algorithm process are proposed to address the problem. To conclude, we demonstrate the effectiveness and stability of our approach through experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
More and more organizations have adopted RBAC as their main access control mechanism which makes security administration more flexible and manageable [1] , [2] . However, with the continuous changing in access control policies (changes in users, permissions and resources) in organizations, the RBAC system needs to be updated quickly. Since changing the permission in the role [3] will influence all users assigned with this role which is prone to error, the security administrator prefers to add new roles to meet the current needs. In [4] , the information management system had 271 users with 348 roles when it was established in 2005. However, most of new roles have ignored business processes and are often assigned to few users, which not only makes a huge redundancy in the RBAC system, but also increases the security administrator management burdens. Therefore it is needed to reconfigure and optimize the RBAC system at regular intervals.
Role engineering [5] , used to define the requisite and correct set of roles, can be divided into two approaches: top-down approach [5] and bottom-up approach [6] . The top-down approach needs to analyze the business processes associated with different permissions carefully which makes it labor intensive and time consuming. The bottom-up approach, called role mining, has aroused extensive interest since it can extract roles from a discretionary user-permission assignment relationships automatically or semi-automatically. There have been several role mining approaches [7] - [11] proposed to reconfigure the RBAC system and keep the reconfigured one as close as possible to the original. However, none of them has considered the differences in the nature and importance of deployed roles and they have to generate roles similar to all deployed roles which is unnecessary.
In this paper, we propose an efficient approach for hierarchy RBAC reconfiguration which minimizes the WSC of RBAC state and the perturbation in roles. We first define three indicators to evaluate the quality of deployed roles using access history log and the problem of hierarchical RBAC reconfiguration with minimal WSC and perturbation. Then propose a heuristic algorithm to solve the problem and analyze its computational complexity. At last we experimentally prove the effectiveness and stability of our approach by two sets of experiments.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly overview the related work and present mathematical background in Section III. In Section IV, we propose three evaluation indicators and the definition of problem. The hierarchy RBAC reconfiguration approach and the heuristic algorithm are proposed in Section V. Then the viability of our approach is proved by experiments in Section VI. Section VII concludes this work and explores future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Role mining was first proposed in [6] and many approaches with different optimization objectives have been proposed recently, such as reducing the number of roles and the WSC of RBAC state [12] , satisfying various constraints (separation of duty, temporal constraints, etc) [13] , [14] , and semantic meaning according to the business processes and user attributes [15] , [16] .
Hachana et al. [17] defined the problem of role sets comparison and proposed a greedy algorithm that mapped inherent relations between the deployed roles and the generated roles based on algebraic expression, but the RBAC system must support the negation of roles (e.g. there are two roles {r 1 : (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 )} and {r 2 : (p 2 , p 3 )}, if the user has permission p 1 , then he will be assigned with the roles r 1 and ¬r 2 .) and most system can't satisfy this requirement. Baumgrass and Strembeck [18] proposed an approach to identify the differences between two RBAC model based on model comparison techniques and defined the migration rules (adding, changing and deleting) to migrate the current-state RBAC model to the target which were implemented on Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF), but the migration time was direct related to the scale of system.
Vaidya et al. [7] first proposed a role mining approach to address the problem of reconfiguring RBAC system and defined a series of similarity metrics based on Jaccard Coefficient. However, the similarity metrics have a great bias when the target set of roles has a number of similar roles. Then these similar roles may be used to compare with the same role from the source set of roles. For example, the source set of roles is R sou = {(p 1 , p 2 ) , (p 3 , p 4 )} and the target set of roles is
67 based on the definition of similarity in [7] . The role (p 1 , p 2 ) is similar to both roles in R tar , but the role (p 3 , p 4 ) is similar to none. Guo et al. [19] proposed a metric to evaluate the role hierarchy based on the transitive closure in the graph representation and defined the Minimal Perturbation Role Hierarchy Problem which minimized quantified disruptions and direct relations. They proposed two heuristic algorithms to solve the problem, RH-Builder and RH-Miner, the former is used when there are deployed roles and the latter is used when there is no given role. Jafari et al. [20] applied the access history log as the source data and proposed a log-based role mining approach the assumptions under which permissions appeared near each other in the log might belong to the same role, but the approach didn't take into consideration the issue of minimizing the structure complexity of the RBAC state by introducing the role hierarchy. Takabi and Joshi [8] first applied role mining to reconfigure the RBAC system with role hierarchy and defined the problem of mining role hierarchy with minimal perturbation. The heuristic algorithm, StateMiner, was proposed to build the hierarchical RBAC state with the minimal perturbation and weighted structural complexity. However, their definition of the similarity between hierarchy relation just considered the number of junior and senior roles that each role had. Zhigang et al. [9] first proposed a definition of similarity between two sets of roles which conforms the commutative law and proposed a hybrid role mining approach for reconfiguring RBAC system based on it. Based on access history log and expert knowledge of the administrator, Zhang et al. [10] proposed a strategy to optimize the RBAC configuration with the purpose of balancing the permission utilization and the perturbation between the new and the initial RBAC configurations and proposed a two-phase algorithm based on Support Vector Machines. Saenko and Kotenko [11] first defined the problem of RBAC system design and reconfiguration with formulas and presented an enhanced genetic algorithm to solve the problem. But its performance and computation complexity mostly depend on the terminal conditions such as the number of iterations that is not easily decided.
The above literatures just focus on generating roles that are most similar to the deployed ones and most of them have the same problem in [7] , what's more, they treat the deployed roles equally without taking into consideration the differences in them and generate more roles than needed which in turn increases the structure complexity of the RBAC reconfigured.
III. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUD

Definition 1 (RBAC Model):
The RBAC model has the following components:
• U , R and P are mnemonic for users, roles and permissions respectively;
• PA ⊆ P × R, a many-to-many mapping of permission to role assignments relationships;
• UA ⊆ U × R, a many-to-many mapping of user to role assignment relationships;
• User(r) = {u ∈ U |(u, r) ∈ UA }, the mapping of the role r onto a set of users;
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• Perm(r) = {p ∈ P |(p, r) ∈ PA }, the mapping of the role r onto a set of permissions;
• UPA ⊆ U × P, a many-to-many mapping of user to permission assignment relationships;
• RH ⊆ R × R, a partial order on roles called inheritance relationships. The symbol r r means that the role r is junior to the role r, which means Perm r ⊆ Perm (r) and User (r) ⊆ User r . If there is no role r that r r ∧ r r , the role r is the direct descendant of the role r and the role r is direct ancestor of the role r .
As is described above, the user-permission assignment relationships can be defined as an m × n binary matrix UPA, m is the number of users and n is the number of permissions. The element UPA(i, j) = 1 indicates the assignment of the permission p j to the user u i .
The direct inheritance relationships between roles can be defined as an k × k binary matrix RH, k is the number of roles. The element RH (i, j) = 1 indicates that role r j is the direct descendant of the role r i and RH (i, i) = 1.
Definition 2 (Boolean Matrix Multiplication):
A boolean matrix multiplication between an m × k boolean matrix A and a k × n boolean matrix B is A ⊗ B = C, where C is an m × n boolean matrix and
Thus the matrices UPA, UA, PA, RH satisfy the equation UPA = UA⊗(RH ⊗ PA) according to the Definition 1. In the remainder of this article, we use PA to represent RH ⊗ PA for brevity.
Definition 4 (Role Mining Problem, RMP): Given a set of users U , a set of permissions P and a user-permission assignment matrix UPA, find a set of roles R, a user-role assignment matrix UA and a role-permission assignment PA, subject to UA ⊗ PA = UPA and minimize the number of roles |R|.
The RMP has been proved to be NP-complete in [12] . Definition 5 (Access History Log): Access history log is a sequence of quaternion in the form of u, p, r, t , it represents the user u invocated the permission p by the role r at time t.
Based on access history log, the user-permission invocation matrix, user-role invocation matrix and role-permission invocation matrix can be defined as follows, in which m, n, k are the numbers of users, permissions and roles.
Definition 6 (User-Permission Invocation, UPI):
The userpermission invocation matrix UPI is an m×n positive integer matrix and the element UPI (i, j) = z indicates the number of times that user u i invoked permission p j is z.
Definition 7 (User-Role Invocation, URI):
The user-role invocation matrix URI is an m × k positive integer matrix and the element URI (i, j) = z indicates the number of times that user u i invoked role r j is z.
Definition 8 (Role-Permission Invocation, RPI):
The rolepermission invocation matrix RPI r for the role r is an |User (r)| × |Perm (r)| positive integer matrix . If the s th user (row) in the matrix UPI is the user u x in the matrix RPI r and the o th permission (column) in the matrix UPI is the permission p y in the matrix RPI r , then the element RPI r (x, y) = z indicates the number of times that the user u s invoked the permission p o by invoking role r is z.
Definition 9 (Weighted Structural Complexity, WSC): Given the weight scheme W = w R , w U , w P , w RH and w R , w U , w P , w RH ∈ Q + {∞}, the weight structural complexity of an RBAC state γ = (R, UA, PA, RH ) is calculated as follows.
IV. HIERARCHICAL RBAC RECONFIGURATION WITH MINIMAL WSC AND PERTURBATION PROBLEM
In this section, we first define three indicators to evaluate the role quality, then define a new definition of the similarity between two sets of roles and define the problem of hierarchical RBAC reconfiguration with minimal WSC and perturbation at last.
A. ROLE QUALITY
Based on access history log and RBAC configuration, we define three indicators, usage, homogeneity and redundancy.
The first indicator usage consists of three factors, the invocation frequency of the role and the permissions in this role, and the latest time that the role invocated. Based on the Definition 5−8, the usage of the role r j can be defined as follows.
Definition 10 (Usage): Given the matrices URI, UPI, RPI r j and the latest invocated time t r j within a time period [t start , t end ] for the role r j , the usage degree of r j is calculated as follows.
where the notation URI ( * , j) is the j th column vector of matrix URI and the notation URI (i, * ) will be used later is the i th row vector of it.
The role with a high usage degree means it is invocated more frequently ( URA ( * , j) 1 ), accomplishes more tasks ( RPI r j 1 ) and has been used longer (t r j ). Thus, it makes better to cater for users and fits workflow well. Then it should be preserved in RBAC system reconfigured.
The second indicator homogeneity is used to describe the similarity of users in a role. Since a task is accomplished VOLUME 6, 2018 by a series of permissions, if there are obvious differences in the invocation frequency of permissions among them, this role is likely to be just a composition of permissions which is meaningless to the system. Based on the Definition 8, the homogeneity of the role r j can be defined as follows.
Definition 11 (Homogeneity, Hom): Given the matrix RPI r j for the role r j , the homogeneity of r j is calculated as follows.
where m is the number of users that role r j is assigned to and
is the average behavior pattern of the users in User r j , cos (a, b) represents the cos similarity |a·b| |a|×|b| . The role with a small homogeneity degree means it may be assigned to a set of dissimilar users whose tasks are different. Thus, this role is meaningless to the users and doesn't have to be preserved in RBAC system reconfigured.
The third indicator redundancy is used to describe the unique of the user-permission assignments covered by the role. Since some tasks can be only accomplished by a few users and permissions, which infers the unique userpermission assignments. Then the role covers these unique assignments is more important to the system. The redundancy of the role r j can be defined as follows.
Definition 12 (Redundancy, Redun): Given the matrix UPA for the role r j , the redundancy of r j is calculated as follows.
where cover(r j ) = {(u x , p y ) ∈ UPA|u x ∈ User(r j ) ∧ p y ∈ Perm(r j )} is the user-permission assignments covered by the role r j . The role with a small redundancy degree means some userpermission assignments covered by it is important and make the role is unique to the system. Thus, this role is should be preserved in RBAC system reconfigured.
Based on equation (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), the quality degree of role r j is calculated as follows.
Degree r j = α × usage r j + β × hom r j + χ × redun r j where the weighting coefficients α, β, χ ∈ (0, 1) and α +β + χ = 1. redun r j is the normalization of redun r j and is calculated as follows.
redun r j = redun max − redun r j redun max − redun min where redun max and redun min is the maximum and minimum of the redundancy for all roles.
Definition 13 (Qulified Role, QRole):
Given the matrices URI, UPI, RPI r for the role r with the weighting coefficients α, β, χ and the threshold th. If the equation Degree (r) ≥ th is satisfied, then the role r is a qualified role and should be preserved in RBAC system reconfigured.
B. PERTURBATION BETWEEN ROLES
In this subsection, we first define the similarity between a pair of roles and then extend it to measure the similarity between two sets of roles, which can be used to evaluate the perturbation in roles caused by RBAC system reconfiguration.
Based on Jaccard coefficient, the similarity between a pair of roles r i , r j can be calculated as follows.
To overcome the shortcoming in [7] , the relationship between the size of roles set is taken into consideration when we calculate the similarity between them and we use the example in Figure. 1 to illustrate the calculating process.
In Figure. 1, ObjRole is the object set of roles and SouRole is the source set of roles. The similarity between them is anti-commutative law which means similarity (SouRole, ObjRole) = similarity(ObjRole, SouRole). In Figure. 1(a)(|SouRole| < |ObjRole|), each role in ObjRole must have a similar role in SouRole, then there is a one-to-many relationship between SouRole and ObjRole, which means each role in SouRole may be similar to more than one role in ObjRole.
In Figure. 1(b)(|SouRole| ≥ |ObjRole|), there is a one-toone relationship between SouRole and ObjRole as each role in ObjRole should be similar to a different role in SouRole. Then there are some roles in SouRole which are not similar to any one in ObjRole. Definition 14 (Similarity): Given two sets of roles SouRole and ObjRole, the similarity between them is calculated as follows.
Step 1 Randomly select role r j ∈ ObjRole, find role r i ∈ SouRole subject to max similarity r i , r j and for all selected pairs of roles (r a , r b ) and (r c , r d ), if r a = r c then r b = r d . When |SouRole| ≥ |ObjRole|, jump to Step 3. Step 2 After Step 1, each role in SouRole is matched with exactly one distinct role in ObjRole, but for the role r q ∈ ObjRole that has not been matched with one in SouRole, find the role r p ∈ SouRole subject to max similarity r p , r q .
Step 3 Take the average over all selected pairs of roles. 
Then the similarity between them is
And if SouRole = {(p 3 , p 4 )}, then the similarity becomes
Then the perturbation (pert) between two sets of roles SouRole and ObjRole is defined as follows.
pert (SouRole, ObjRole) = 1−similarity (SouRole, ObjRole)
C. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
In order to minimize the manager burden and the perturbation between the generated roles and deployed roles, the objective function is defined as follows.
Definition 15 (Objective Function, OF): Given a weighted structural complexity, WSC, of the RBAC state reconfigured, a perturbation measure between the two sets of roles, the objective function is defined as follows.
where w is a weighting coefficient between 0 and 1 to bias the objective function from the perturbation between two sets of roles to the WSC of RBAC state reconfigured.
Based on prior definitions, the problem of hierarchical RBAC reconfiguration with minimal WSC and perturbation is defined as follows.
Definition 16 (The Problem of Hierarchical RBAC Reconfiguration With Minimal WSC and Perturbation):
Given a set of users U , a set of permissions P, a user-permission assignment matrix UPA, a set of qualified roles QRole that are selected from the deployed roles DRole based on the matrices URI, UPI, RPI DRole , find an RBAC state γ = (R, UA, PA, RH ), subject to UPA = UA ⊗ PA, such that minimizes the objective function of WSC (γ , W ) and the perturbation between R and QRole.
The problem of hierarchical RBAC reconfiguration with minimal WSC and perturbation can be reduced to Basic RMP by defining the weighting coefficient w = 0 and the weight scheme W = 1, 0, 0, 0 . In this situation, the objective function is just to minimize the number of generated roles which is the same as RMP, so the problem of hierarchical RBAC reconfiguration with minimal WSC and perturbation is NP-complete as well.
V. LOG-BASED HIERARCHICAL RBAC RECONFIGURATION APPROACH
In this section, we present the log-based hierarchical RBAC reconfiguration approach to address the problem defined in Definition 16 by the heuristic algorithm designed.
A. DESCRIPTION
Our approach consists of four phases, find the qualified roles from the deployed roles based on access history log, construct the candidate hierarchical RBAC state, remove roles to minimize the objective function and restore removed roles which are useful. Its flow chart is shown in Figure. 
Phase 1:
The matrices URI, UPI, RPI DR are generated based on access history log and the qualified roles (QRole) can be selected according to its usage degree, homogeneity degree and redundancy degree. Then we generate the set of candidate roles (CRole) from the matrix UPA and select the set of similar roles (SimRole) which is the most similar to the set of qualified roles.
Phase 2: The candidate hierarchical RBAC state is constructed by the set of candidate roles.
Phase 3: As the set of candidate roles are much bigger than needed, we need to remove candidate roles to minimize the objective function OF. The order of removing candidate roles is based on its score which takes into consideration the similarity and redundancy and is calculated as follows. If score (crole) is much bigger than others, it means that crole has a lower similarity with the qualified roles and remove it may not break the equation UA ⊗ PA = UPA as it has a higher redundancy. What's more, considering the greedy approach to remove candidate roles is not an optimal solution, we allow to remove crole if the objective function increases slightly which partially compensates for this fact.
Phase 4: Since the different order of removing candidate roles may lead to the different hierarchical RBAC state, we check each role in the set of removed roles (RemRole) whether it will improve the object function and restore the useful one to the hierarchical RBAC state.
B. HEURISTIC ALGORITHM
In order to improve the efficiency of our approach, we design a heuristic algorithm and provide its walkthrough in Algorithm 1. The procedure Score(crole) returns the score to each crole according to the equation 5.1.
Phase 1: Line 1-3 in Algorithm 1 corresponds to Phase 1. At first the qualified roles (QRole) are selected based on its usage, homogeneity and redundancy. Then the set of candidate roles (CRole) and corresponding matrices UA, PA are generated from the matrix UPA by FastMiner [21] and the SimRole which is the most similar (minimal perturbation) to QRole is selected from CRole by Algorithm 2. In Algorithm 2, the similarity matrix Sim is firstly constructed in which the row represents the crole from CRole\RemRole and the column represents the role from QRole (Line 2-4). The element Sim (i, j) is the similarity between pair of roles crole i , qrole j . Line 5-9 corresponds to the step 1 in Definition 14. In each iteration, the maximum element Sim (x, y) is selected and the row Sim (x, * ) and column Sim ( * , y) are set to zero. Line 10-15 corresponds to step 2 when |CRole\RemRole| < |QRole| and select the most similar crole x for each quality roles in QRole without considering whether crole x has been selected to be similar with another quality role (crole x ∈ SimRole). Line 16 corresponds to step 3 and calculates the perturbation between CRole\RemRole and QRole. 
In Algorithm 3, when we try to insert crole i into the role hierarchy, we check its relationship in permission set with each direct descendant crole k of Rootrole (RH (|CRole| + 1, k) = 1) (Line 3, 5, 9, 11) and take appropriate actions (Line 4, 6-8, 10, 12). If it has no relationships with any direct descendant of Rootrole, we make the crole i as the direct descendant of Rootrole (Line 13-14) .
Based on the inheritance relationship, if RH (i, j) = 1, then Perm (r i ) ⊇ Perm r j and User (r i ) ⊆ User r j . For the sake to reduce the management burden, Perm (r i ) can be reduced to Perm (r i ) \Perm r j and User r j can be reduced to User r j \User (r i ). In Algorithm 5, Line 2-9 corresponds to the above simplification operations.
Phase 3: Line 11-23 in Algorithm 1 corresponds to Phase 3. At first the score of each crole is calculated according to equation 5.1 and is sorted in descending order. Then each crole is checked in order by Algorithm 6 whether removing it will change access control policies. If the crole does not belong to SimRole, it can be removed directly by Algorithm 7 because removing it won't affect the VOLUME 6, 2018 perturbation and will reduce the WSC (Line 14-15 in Algorithm 1). If it belongs to SimRole, we check whether removing it will increase the OF new to (1 + δ) × OF (Line 16-23 in Algorithm 1).
Phase 4: Line 24-35 in Algorithm 1 corresponds to Phase 4. Each crole in RemRole is checked whether recovering it will reduce the perturbation (Line 27-30 in Algorithm 1). Then check whether the OF is also reduced (Line 31-33 in Algorithm 1).
C. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The computational complexity analysis takes a row operation as the unit operation and the results are shown in table 1.
The computational complexity of finding the qualified roles is O(U 1 +U 2 +· · ·+U |DRole| ), where U i is the number of users assigned with drole i . In the worst case, each deployed role is assigned to all users (|U |) and the computational complexity is O (|U | × |DRole|). Then the computational complexity of our approach is
As |CRole| {|DRole| , |QRole| , |U |}, the computational complexity of our approach is O(|CRole| 3 ).
VI. EXPERIMENT
In this section two sets of experiments are carried out, the first is to compare our approach with previous proposals and the second is to research the relationships between parameters in our approach. All experiments have been implemented by using MATLAB R2016 on a ThinkPad T440P running Win10 (2.40 Ghz Intel Core i7, 8GB 1067Mhz DDR3 SDRAM).
As there is no access history log in real datasets (e.g. Domino, Apj), we take five steps to create four manual datasets with access history log.
Step 1 The dataset generator algorithm takes the number of users, permissions, roles and two limit parameters (the maximum number of roles a user can have and the maximum number of permissions a role can have) as input. The outputs are three boolean matrices UA, PA and UPA = UA ⊗ PA.
Step 2 Repeat Step 2 to Step 5 k times, k is the number of roles.
Step 3 Randomly select a user and invoke one or more permissions by his roles, then log in the form of u, {p 1 , · · · , p n } , r, t . Repeat s times, s is the number of permissions assigned to the user.
Step 4 Repeat
Step 3 m 2 times, m is the number of the users.
Step 5 Randomly choose one or more operations below. a) Add one role. Add one column and one row in the matrices UA and PA, set the elements according to the matrix UPA. b) Add one user. Add one row in the matrices UPA and UA, set the elements according to the permissions and roles assigned with the new user. Add one role if there is no subset of the role set can satisfy the permission set the new user has. c) Add one permission. Add one column in the matrices UPA and PA. Set the elements in the matrix UPA according to users assigned with the new permission. Then add one role containing the new permission and update the elements in the matrices UA and PA. d) Delete one role. Delete the corresponding column and row in the matrices UA and PA. Then update the corresponding elements in the matrix UPA. e) Delete one user. Delete the corresponding row in the matrices UPA and UA. f) Delete one permission. Delete the corresponding column in the matrices UPA and PA. g) Assign/Revoke a role to/from a user. Update the corresponding elements in the matrices UA and UPA; h) Assign/Revoke a permission to/from a user.
Update the corresponding elements in the matrices UPA and UA. Add one role if there is no subset of the role set can satisfy the permission set updated. i) Add/Delete a permission to/from a role. Update the corresponding elements in the matrices UPA and PA. The statistics for four manual datasets is shown in Table 2 . Dataset 1 and 2 were the same when they were generated in Step 1. As repeating Step 5 different times, the numbers of deployed role in two datasets are different. Dataset 3 and 4 are in the case of Dataset 1 and 2. In the first set of experiments, we evaluate the performance of our approach with five other approaches (MP-RM [7] , StateMiner (SM) [8] , HybridMiner (HM) [9] , DDRE [10] , and GA-RM [11] ) in the similarity (Sim), weight structural complexity (WSC) and computation time (Time). All results reported for each dataset are averaged over the five runs and Table 3 shows the comparison results. Since their definitions of similarity between two sets of roles are different from ours, then we adopt the Definition 13 and recognize all deployed roles as the qualified roles in these approaches.
As the optimization objective of MP-RM, DDRE and GA-RM don't take into consideration the weight structural complexity of RBAC, we just list the results The results in Table 3 demonstrate our approach has a better performance compared with others. With the number of DRole increases. there is an obvious increase on WSC and Time in other approaches, because these approaches must generate more roles to keep a high similarity with DRole, which in turn increases WSC and Time. On the contrary, our approach has a more stable performance because the number of qualified roles is mainly affected by the threshold th and a larger DRole may even conversely decrease the number of qualified roles, then WSC and Time have no direct relationships to the number of DRole.
As there has been a detail discussion on performance of MP-RM, SM and HM in [9] , we will not repeat it any more. And the Sim of DDRE and GA-RM is much lower than others which is mostly because their definition of the similarity between a pair of roles considered not just the same permissions they both have, but also the same users they are both assigned to. The Time of DDRE and SM is much longer than MP-RM and HM, because the optimization objectives of DDRE and SM are much more complex. As the computation complexity of GA-RM depends largely on the termination conditions and maximum iterations of genetic algorithm, its Time is the longest.
In the second set of experiments, we conducted the experiments on the relationships between threshold th (0 to 0.9) and three indices. The results are shown in Figure. 3-5. shows that Sim floats up and down slightly with th increasing. As th increases, the number of qualified roles decreases and the average of quality degrees increases. But the role with a higher quality degree doesn't mean there will be a candidate role that is more similar to it, because some permissions in the qualified role may be deleted. For example, when the threshold is 0.5, the qualified roles are r 1 = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ), r 2 = (p 4 , p 5 , p 6 , p 7 ) and r 3 = (p 8 , p 9 , p 10 ), but the permissions p 4 , p 6 are deleted in Step 5. The candidate roles similar to them are r 1 = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ), r 2 = (p 5 , p 7 ) and r 3 = (p 8 , p 9 ), the similarity between them is 13/18. When the threshold increases to 0.9, the qualified roles are reduced to r 2 = (p 4 , p 5 , p 6 , p 7 ) and r 3 = (p 8 , p 9 , p 10 ), the candidate roles similar to them are r 2 = (p 5 , p 7 ) and r 3 = (p 8 , p 9 ), but the similarity between them reduces to 7/12. So there is no direct relationships between Sim and threshold th. Figure. 4 shows that WSC decreases slightly with th increasing and becomes a constant at last. It is because with the number of qualified roles decreasing, there will be less redundancies in the final set of roles which means the less WSC. For example, the qualified roles are r 1 = (p 1 ), r 2 = (p 3 , p 4 ) and r 3 = (p 1 , p 2 , p 4 ), the candidate roles similar to them are r 1 = (p 1 ), r 2 = (p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ) and r 3 = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ), then r 3 is a redundant role as it is the combination of r 1 and r 2 . If the qualified role r 3 is removed with th increasing, the candidate role r 3 will be removed if it won't affect the access control policies. And when th goes up to some extent, there will be no qualified roles and the objective function changes to minimize WSC which makes it become a constant. Figure. 5 shows that Time decreases slightly with th increasing in our approach. According to the analysis of computation complexity, the number of qualified roles only affects the computation complexity of procedure Sim. So with th increasing, Time decreases slightly.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first propose three indicators to evaluate the quality of roles based on access history log and define the method to evaluate the perturbation in permissions between two sets of roles. Then an efficient approach for reconfiguring hierarchical RBAC system with minimal WSC and perturbation is proposed. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and stability of our approach at last.
As for future work, there are still a few interesting issues to be considered. One issue is to introduce intelligent algorithms to solve the problem and the other is how to assign similar roles to users for the sake of meeting user usage pattern.
